Analysis of recent sanctions in competition law
Competition law plays a central role in regulating markets by ensuring fairness and transparency among economic actors. In recent years, both in France and at the European level, competition authorities have intensified their vigilance and pronounced significant sanctions against companies for anti-competitive practices. Whether it isabuse of a dominant position orcartels, these measures illustrate the desire of regulators to preserve a competitive market for the benefit of consumers and innovative companies.
This analysis focuses on the main recent decisions, their motivations and the impacts they have on the national and European competitive landscape, in a constantly changing economic context.
On the French level
Sanctions in France experienced an exceptional level in 2024, with historic amounts in several major cases.
The Competition Authority published details of the total amount of sanctions it has been able to impose over the past ten years in its 2024 annual report:
|
Years |
Evolution of financial penalties after appeal (in millions of euros) |
|
2024 |
1,427.7 |
|
2023 |
167.6 |
|
2022 |
467.9 |
|
2021 |
873.5 |
|
2020 |
463.1 |
|
2019 |
587.9 |
|
2018 |
236.2 |
|
2017 |
493.8 |
|
2016 |
192.5 |
|
2015 |
1,135.2 |
|
2014 |
936.0 |
Source: 2024 Annual Report of the Competition Authority
The gap between the total amount of sanctions imposed in 2023 and 2024 is striking. In 2023, the total amount of sanctions imposed was 167.6 million euros, while in 2024, out of eight sanctions decisions (6 cartels, 1 abuse of a dominant position and 1 obstruction during OVS), a total of 1.42 billion euros in fines will have been imposed on the sanctioned
companies.
French decisions rendered in 2024
The most significant decisions of 2024 with the Authority are undoubtedly three in number:
- Decision 24-D-11 with a penalty of 611 million euros imposed on ten manufacturers and two distributors of household appliances.
In this decision, the Authority sanctions, on the one hand, ten suppliers for having, each, implemented a generalized agreement with its distributors to fix, directly or indirectly, the retail price of its products and, on the other hand, two distributors for having each implemented a generalized agreement with its suppliers for the same purposes. These practices had been revealed by an application for leniency but, with the exception ofexchanges of information between the manufacturers, for which the grievance was not upheld by the college, the agreement between the manufacturers was the subject of a previous prohibition decision (Competition Authority, Decision No. 18-D-24, 5 December 2018). Ten companies, with the exception of Boulanger and SEB, decided not to contest the grievances.
This decision, apart from the exceptional amount of the fine imposed, notably applied the Sumal case law (CJEU, 6 Oct. 2021, Case C-882/19) and L’Oréal (CA of Paris, June 18, 2020, No. 19/08826, paragraphs 67 to 79) on the downward liability of companies. Indeed, the Authority recalled that it was possible, under certain conditions, to retain within the scope of the value of sales for the calculation of the pecuniary penalty that carried out by a company not receiving the notification of objections but which turns out to be the subsidiary of a parent company, direct author of an infringement of competition law or parent company of another subsidiary company itself direct author. As such, the Authority called into question the companies Darty Grand Est SNC, as companies whose economic activity presented, during the infringement, a concrete link with the object of the latter, and Darty Grand Ouest SNC, as successor to Darty Provence Méditerranée, Darty Alsace Lorraine and Darty Nord whose economic activity presented, during the infringement, a concrete link with the object of the latter.
- Decision 24-D-09 in which the Authority sanctioned the manufacturers Schneider Electric and Legrand and the distributors Rexel and Sonepar to the tune of 470 million euros.
Under the terms of this decision, two manufacturers of low-voltage electrical equipment, Schneider Electric and Legrand, in collaboration with their distributors Rexel and Sonepar, were sanctioned by the Authority for having participated in two separate vertical cartels relating to the fixing of resale prices. The first agreement, between Schneider Electric and its distributors Rexel and Sonepar, took place from December 2012 to September 2018. The second, between Legrand and Rexel, took place from May 2012 to September 2015.
In the low-voltage electrical equipment sector, manufacturers and distributors conclude annual framework contracts following commercial negotiations. In practice, end customers often ask for prices lower than these standard tariff prices, and for this they contact suppliers directly. In order to meet this demand without distributors being forced to resell at a loss, the framework contracts provided a price adjustment mechanism for distributors, allowing them to obtain a “waived” purchase price, obtained in the form of a credit note, in order to align with the price requested by the end customer and to offer additional discounts if necessary.
The authority found that the practices implemented by the manufacturers and distributors in question had in fact led to the fixing of sales prices to end customers, thus reducing the distributors’pricing freedom. This cartel had the effect of restricting competition between them, contributing to the artificial maintenance of high prices on the French market.The evidence revealed that the overridden prices, although presented as “maximum” or “recommended “, were in fact predetermined by Schneider Electric and Legrand as fixed prices, devoid of any real negotiation margin for distributors.This decision is, in fact, in line with the Authority’s case law on vertical resale price fixing (see for example the following vertical agreements sanctioned: Decision 23-D-13 of 19 December 2023; Decision 23-D-12 of 11 December 2023; Decision 21-D-26 of 8 November 2021).It shows that a pricing arrangement, even unusual in the context of tripartite contractual relations between supplier, distributor and end customer, can nevertheless constitute an anti-competitive vertical agreement between supplier and distributor.The fact that this organization results from a direct solicitation of the end customer from the supplier, in order to process a “particular market“, does not legitimize the intervention of the supplier in the setting of the resale price applied by the distributor.
- Decision 24-D-03 in which the Authority imposed a penalty of €250 million on Google for non-compliance with some of its commitments made in June 2022.
This decision is a new episode in the so-called neighbouring rights case, which pits press publishers against Google. At the end of a settlement procedure, Google is condemned for non-compliance with the commitments made in Decision No. 22-D-13 of 21 June 2022, a decision to accept commitments which itself followed a decision on provisional measures. Indeed, Google had already been forced by the Authority to negotiate in good faith the terms of remuneration for the use, on its platform, of the content of press publishers. In Decision 24-D-03, the Authority sanctions Google for having, in particular, disregarded its commitment to cooperate with the agent, the firm Accuracy in charge of monitoring and controlling the implementation of the commitments made by Google, and for not having respected four of its seven commitments, the objective of which was to guarantee the following principles:
- Conduct negotiations in good faith, based on transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria within three months (commitments 1 and 4);
- Transmit to publishers or press agencies the information necessary for the transparent evaluation of their remuneration for neighbouring rights (commitment no.2);
- Take the necessary measures to ensure that the negotiations do not affect the other economic relations existing between Google and publishers or news agencies (commitment no.6).
The decision is of particular interest because of its developments concerning the integration of artificial intelligence. During the deployment of Bard and then Gemini, several shortcomings were noted: ARCEP considers that Google should have warned publishers and news agencies of the exploitation of their content by its AI and provided them with a technical device allowing them to oppose it.
French decisions rendered in 2025
Concerning 2025, the sanctions imposed by the Authority are higher than those of 2023, since we are already at a total of 179.5 million euros charged under two decisions:
- A global penalty of 29.5 million euros in Decision 25-D-03 concerning two separate agreements between Ausy (now Randstad Digital) and Alten on the one hand, and Expleo and Bertrandt on the other hand, for having put in place general non-disclosure agreements.
More specifically, two bilateral agreements are sanctioned by the Authority:
- The first, between Ausy, the leniency applicant, and Alten, concerns a non-disclosure agreement in the form of a gentlemen’s agreement aimed at prohibiting each other from soliciting and hiring their respective staff, an essential competitive parameter in the labour markets in which the companies in question are active. This agreement is of a general nature and concerns a certain type of executive employees of the sanctioned companies, the “business managers” (grievance No. 1). The agreement between Ausy and Alten had been implemented for almost 10 years, between 2007 and 2016. The two companies are also accused of having exchanged information concerning the mobility or mobility projects of their staff. ARCEP dismisses the parties’ argument that these agreements were used to prevent an act of unfair competition or a problem of massive disorganization of the teams, since it aimed to prevent any respective recruitment of business managers, even when it was a single employee (“a Salesperson”, “some commercial CVS” or “one of our managers”). In particular, the Authority noted that the scope of the agreement is not limited in its duration and applies to all business managers, regardless of the mission to which they are assigned and the client for whom they intervene. In this context, the disputed agreement was intended to agree on a parameter of competition between companies, to the detriment of their staff.
- The second also took the form of a general gentlemen’s agreement on non-disclosure between Expleo and Bertrandt, outside any partnership contract between the sanctioned companies (grievance No. 2). The Authority has noted the general and unrestricted nature of this “gentleman agreement“, in particular with regard to the persons concerned, the “employees” or “suppliers”, the “employees or S/T [subcontractors]” as well as the “own workforce and Ranks 2 and temporary workers”. The agreement between the Expleo Group and Bertrandt consisted in agreeing to refrain from recruiting their respective staff, whether at the request of the company or following a spontaneous application, by consulting each other when movements were planned. These practices, insofar as they constitute an agreement for the allocation of sources of supply, are among the anti-competitive cartels expressly mentioned by the provisions of Article 101 (1) (c) TFEU and Article L. 420-1, 4° C.com. They are considered, according to settled case law, as constituting “particularly serious violations of competition” and having “a restrictive object of competition in themselves“, this analysis having also been confirmed by the Court of Justice precisely with regard to non-discriminatory agreements.
Unlike the non-competition clause, which limits the rights of the employee after the end of his employment contract, the non-solicitation clause, also called a non-solicitation agreement, is concluded between two companies in order to prohibit each of them from recruiting the employees of the other. This clause can be incorporated into a commercial contract or, as in this case, consists of an oral or informal agreement applying to all employees, without restriction of duration or geographical area.
This decision sends a clear message: the labour market is fully within the scope of competition law. When an agreement between two companies prohibits each other from recruiting each other’s employees, it distorts competition between employers, limits employee mobility, and exposes the parties to severe penalties.
This decision is unprecedented in that it sanctions non-disclosure agreements concluded autonomously, that is to say without being integrated into another cartel, such as a price-fixing cartel.
- A fine of 150 million in Decision 25-D-02 imposed on the company Apple, for having, between April 2021 and July 2023, abused its dominant position in the sector of the distribution of mobile applications on iOS and iPadOS terminals.
In April 2021, Apple introduced with version 14.5 of iOS and iPadOS a device called App Tracking Transparency (ATT). This mechanism aims to strengthen the protection of users’ privacy by informing them through a standardized window and asking for their consent before mobile apps collect their data from third-party apps in the Apple ecosystem. This consent, required from the first use after downloading from the App Store, authorizes the application to access the terminal’s advertising identifier, the IDFA, which allows the user’s activity to be tracked through different applications and sites external to the device.
In anticipation of Apple’s launch of the ATT system, several associations representing online advertising players, such as the media, internet companies, advertising agencies, technical intermediaries, publishers and mobile marketing agencies, had referred the matter to the Competition Authority in October 2020. In its decision of 17 March 2021, the Authority chose not to impose provisional measures, indicating that the examination of the merits of the case should continue.
The Authority has found that the ATT device imposed by Apple is not necessary, insofar as it does not allow the collection of valid consent with regard to the applicable law as it results, in particular the Data Protection Act. Moreover, the rules governing the interaction between the various windows thus displayed undermine the neutrality of the device. Finally, the Authority noted an asymmetry of treatment between that which Apple reserved for itself and that which it applied to publishers.
This case illustrates a new collaboration between the Competition Authority and the Commission nationale de l ‘informatique et des libertés (CNIL). Indeed, the Authority took into account two opinions issued by the CNIL around the issues of application of privacy legislation raised by this case, integrating these elements into its competitive analysis. It thus demonstrates that competition law and the protection of privacy are not antagonistic, but on the contrary converge to ensure a transparent and fair market, preserving the interests and well-being of consumers.
The future prospects of the control of competitive practices in France
For the rest of 2025, as well as 2026, the Authority has informed us of the main guidelines that will guide its intervention in its Roadmap, published on 10 July. These may be summed up as follows:
- Preserving the openness and fairness of digital markets: The Authority has long been committed to taking into account the specificities of digital markets and this action will remain a priority. The Authority is currently examining a request for provisional measures in the search engine sector. It also stands ready to exercise the investigative powers conferred on it by the Law of 21 May 2024 (Law No.2024-449) with a view to the implementation of the European Regulation on Digital Markets.
- Continue the integration of the sustainability imperative into competition policy: the Authority is determined to sanction practices that would deprive consumers of their ability to make an informed choice about the characteristics of products and services related to sustainable development. It will rely in particular on its opinion of January 2025 on environmental rating systems for consumer products and services.
- Supporting purchasing power: After the inflationary shock of 2022-2023, the decline in inflation in 2024 allowed household purchasing power to begin to increase again. However, the impact on households remains sustainable, so vigilance remains necessary to protect purchasing power.
These last two years confirm, thus, a tightening of sanctions with increased vigilance of the Authority to the new challenges of the market (dematerialization, platforms, sustainable development). The flagship decisions recall the importance of the deterrent system, the diversity of the sectors concerned and the incentive for compliance and risk prevention.
At the European level
The most notable case concerns Meta (combining Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp), sanctioned in November 2024 by the European Commission for €798 million for linking its online classifieds service Facebook Marketplace to its social network Facebook and for imposing unfair commercial conditions on other providers of online classifieds services. (European Commission, 14 November 2024, No. AT.40684, Facebook Marketplace)
This decision illustrates the increasing severity of anti-competitive practices in the digital sectors and was the seventh largest fine imposed by the European Union for anti-competitive practices (excluding cartels).
However, on anti-competitive practices, Google remains the most sanctioned at the European level, with a total of about 8 billion euros in fines, including a record fine of 4.34 billion euros:
- On 5 September 2025, the European Commission announced that it had sanctioned Google with €2.95 billion for abusing its dominant position in the online advertising sector (so-called “Adtech” case, case number not communicated to date). Specifically, Google is alleged to have committed this offense by favoring its own online display ad technology services over competing ad technology service providers, advertisers, and online publishers. The Commission ordered Google to: 1) end these self-preferential practices; and 2) implement measures to end its inherent conflicts of interest throughout the Adtech supply chain. The American giant has 60 days to inform the Commission of how it intends to proceed.
- In the European Commission‘s “AdSense” decision (40411, June 20, 2019), an initial fine of 1.49 billion euros was imposed on Google, accusing it of abusing its dominant market position by imposing a number of restrictive clauses in contracts with third-party websites, thus preventing its competitors from placing their contextual advertisements on these sites. However, this decision was partially annulled by the General Court of the European Union (TEU, 18 September 2024, T-334/19), on the ground in particular that the Commission failed to take into account all the relevant circumstances in its assessment of the duration of the contractual clauses that it had qualified as unfair.
In earlier decisions and judgments with respect to Google:
In the European Commission‘s “Android” decision (AT.40099, July 18, 2018), where nearly 4.34 billion euros in fines for anti-competitive practices related to the taxation of applications were imposed on Google. The Commission’s decision addresses three specific types of contractual restrictions imposed by Google on device manufacturers and mobile network operators. These restrictions allowed Google to use Android as a vehicle to consolidate the dominant position of its search engine. The Commission concludes in its decision that Google has a dominant position in the markets for general internet search services, licensed smart mobile operating systems and online app stores for the Android mobile operating system.
- In the “Google Shopping” decision, the European Commission (39740, 27 June 2017) imposed a fine of approximately 2.4 billion euros on Google for abusing its dominant position in several national internet search markets by favouring its own product comparison service over that of its competitors. The General Court of the European Union having, in essence, confirmed this decision and maintained this fine, Google and Alphabet appealed to the Court of Justice, which dismissed it and thus confirmed the judgment of the General Court (CJEU, 10 September 2024, C-48/22 P).
This Google saga perfectly illustrates the constant and determined fight that competition authorities, both French and European, are waging against companies occupying dominant positions in fast-growing markets. These authorities deploy enhanced and coordinated means to detect, prosecute and sanction anti-competitive behaviour, thus demonstrating their commitment to preserving competitive dynamics and ensuring a level playing field for all economic actors.
To complete our analysis of sanctions at European level, in a recent case, the General Court of the European Union confirmed the sanction of €33.6 million against HSBC Holdings imposed by the European Commission in 2021 (European Commission, 28 June 2021, AT.39914), for its participation in cartels on the financial derivatives market. This case law confirms the trend towards firmness, including against large financial institutions (TEU, 27 November 2024, T-561/21). In this judgment, the General Court dismissed the action for annulment brought by the HSBC entities, against the Commission decision amending its decision to impose a fine of EUR 33,606,000 on HSBC for a single and continuous infringement having as its object the alteration of the normal rate of price fixing on the euro interest rate derivatives market.
The recent period is thus characterized by an increase in European sanctions in the digital and financial sectors. European courts confirm the Commission’s firmness and encourage further reforms to accelerate action, target new behaviours (algorithmic collusion, licensing in AI) and strengthen deterrence, especially in investigations targeting large companies.
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